Willingness for Combat of the American Soldier
a. How do unfavorable attitudes developed in the soldier during training relate to his combat performance? Many commanders have stated: "Suppose that many combat soldiers did have unfavorable attitudes. What of it? They fought, didn't they?" The question still remains: How well did they fight in relation to their potential abilities?
b. During World War II, the research branch, Department of the Army conducted a series of studies on the willingness for combat of the American soldier. These studies support the fact that attitudes and performances during training are related to performance in combat and that individuals who had the least satisfactory attitude relating to combat while in training later tended to be relatively poor combat soldiers. The results of these surveys also showed that at least 241 percent of the Soldiers said that they would rather not, or felt they could not, kill an enemy soldier. It is vitally important that the leader in training be sensitive to their Soldiers attitudes and strive to build an attitude of confidence in their combat skills.
c. Further studies indicated that a large percentage of the available firepower in units was never fully developed. This failure to fire was due, in part, to the Soldier's belief that firing his weapon entailed increased exposure. Primarily, however, it was due to a paralysis caused by such fears as being wounded or disfigured, lack of confidence in weapons, in leaders, in fellow Soldiers, or in themselves.
Factors Adversely Affecting Combat Effectiveness
a. Factors adversely affecting the combat potential of the command include fear, panic, discouragement, isolation, and lack of confidence by the individual in themselves, in the unit, or in their leaders. The presence of fear and a tendency to panic fluctuate with changes in condition of the troops, in degree of tactical success, and physical conditions on the battlefield. Normally, it is the commander of the small unit who must sense the development of situations interpreted by the troops as critical and who must take personal action to eliminate conditions conducive to fear and panic. However, it is largely the commander of the large unit who trains and indoctrinates the small unit commander and who initiates policies that help themselves to counteract fear and panic.
b. The disruption of mutual support among elements of the combat unit sometimes results in the isolation of units on the battlefield. In such situations, units should not be allowed to feel that they have been forgotten, neglected, or abandoned, or that they are in any way acting alone or fighting a "sacrifice" mission. They must be assured that the commander adequately appreciates their position, is confident of their ability to extricate themselves from the situation and to perform their mission creditably and will assist them in every way possible.
Fear
a. Fear, although a painful emotion that may at times be incapacitating, is actually nature's way of preparing the body for action. Body functioning is stepped up; sugar and adrenaline are released into the blood to act as fuel for the fight ahead; there is a temporary loss of any feeling of fatigue. Even blood clots more readily.
b. Nevertheless, it is sometimes difficult for a tense, frightened soldier to look upon fear in the light of body chemistry, especially if the Soldier period of fright is prolonged. The Soldier may become helpless and demoralized, completely paralyzed, or immobilized by their fear.
c. It is here that training, and discipline pay off. Training will teach the Soldier to respond from force of habit to specific battle orders, even though battle commands often cannot be given as in training. It will become second nature to them to carry out their own job as a member of the fighting team to begin the action that will relieve their fear.
Rumors
a. Rumors are essentially anonymous communications that yield readily to distribution. Those which seem plausible under existing conditions circulate rapidly. Rumors destroy confidence and create uncertainty. In combat, when soldiers may be uncertain and insecure, rumors may create an illusion and a critical situation where, in reality, none exists. Thus rumors create a condition of high susceptibility to emotional and irrational behavior. The hearers become excited and react in an unreasonable fashion to even weak suggestions. Additional rumors can incite a mob action or panic. Rumors are most effective when the individual sees them as plausible or suitable to their circumstances. However, once the characteristics of mass psychology destroy the ability to reason, rumors no longer require credence to be acceptable. This was one of the bases of the propaganda campaigns of our adversaries in World War II. The most fantastic rumors were accepted without analysis because people were fearful and lacked factual information in a critical situation.
b. A rumor that supports a suspicion or a hatred, verifies a fear, or expresses a hope will be repeated and reinforced by the emotions of the teller. When rumors spread rapidly and far, it means that hates, fears, or hopes are common to the many people who are doing the repeating. Rumors are repeated even by those who do not believe them because they provide a chance to express an emotion which would otherwise have to be suppressed.
c. Confidence varies continuously between overconfidence and shaken confidence. Rumor causes violent fluctuations between these extremes. For this reason, rumors must be controlled. Effective rumor control requires an attentive ear to detect and identify rumors and specific action to discredit and eliminate them at the source. Rumors originated by the enemy necessitate counterintelligence measures to determine their source. Specific control measures applicable to all rumors include-
(1) Information programs.
(2) Disseminating information on plans and operations as complete as security requirements permit. Give the troops as many facts as possible.
(3) Finding out and attempting to eliminate the basic conditions creating uncertainty and frustrations before they accumulate.
(4) Keeping informed regarding current rumors in the unit. A long-range program of instilling faith in the information passed out by the chain of command is better than a point-for-point rebuttal of rumors passed along the "grapevine." Soldiers want information! If factual information is not expeditiously supplied by the chain of command, then the "rumor campaigns'' take over. The obvious disadvantage of replying directly to rumors is that the rumors may be reinforced and given credibility.
(5) By example and instruction, emphasizing democratic principles to eliminate hatred, prejudice, and animosity.
(6) Developing confidence in individuals toward their leaders.
d. Keeping your Soldiers informed assumes a major role on the battlefield. A Soldier who is uninformed or misinformed cannot be expected to produce at their maximum ability in combat. Soldiers must know what is expected of them and what means they have at their disposal to assist them in accomplishing the mission. Troops who are aware beforehand of the enemy's capabilities exert a positive influence toward successful accomplishment of the mission.
Panic
a. Panic develops when a Soldier is overcome with fear. It may be evidenced by sudden flight or by freezing in place. Panic may develop in a group faced with sudden catastrophe or from a few individuals fleeing from destruction in a critical situation. The critical situations responsible for the mass emotion of fear may be real, as in the case of bombing raids, or imaginary, such as those created by terror, enemy propaganda, and malicious gossip. The seeds of panic are always present in troops as long as they believe that physical danger is near.
b. The emotion of fear reaches panic proportions only when individuals believe themselves incapable of overcoming a critical situation. When emotional tension is produced by a critical situation, individuals become excitable and highly susceptible to suggestion. Nothing is more likely to collapse a line of infantry in combat than the sight of a few of its number in full and unexplained flight to the rear. Sudden and unexplained motion in the wrong direction is an open invitation to disaster. As panic spreads, a Soldier will join a disorganized fleeing crowd without stopping to ask why they are running. When discipline breaks, only a small minority of the most hardy individuals will retain self-control. The others cannot stand fast if the circumstances appear to justify flight. The obvious fear among the panicked troops is evidence that there is something to be afraid of and to escape from.
c. Any suggested or observed movement may be interpreted as a means of escape and cause of sudden flight. This flight is not generally focused upon a known goal other than escape, but is rapidly canalized in a certain direction. Someone has to be the first to break and run. Studies of local panics during Korea revealed that a lack of information and the sight of running Soldiers were the real crux of the fear. It was found that those who had started to run, and who in doing so had started a panic, rationalized an excuse for their action.
d. The emotion of fear is reinforced by escape action to such a degree that reason is greatly reduced. A Soldier in panic runs without much rational thought. The Soldier's fear is increased by the fears of their fleeing companions, and their field of attention is narrowed. The Soldier is forgetful of honor and discipline.
e. Troops in combat are continually in the presence of a situation threatening death or bodily harm. During such times of stress, they are subject to all of the anxieties and fears conducive to panic. Experienced troops who are well trained, organized, disciplined, and led seldom give way to panic because they are confident of their ability to master any situation regardless of its critical nature. This power to resist fear and panic fluctuates according to psychological and physiological conditions of the troops, the degree of tactical success, and the physical conditions of the battlefield. You must constantly measure and strengthen the confidence of your command. You must realize that even experienced and well-trained troops have panicked in situations which appeared beyond their control as a result of rumor or unfavorable circumstances. You must sense the development of situations interpreted by the troops as critical and take action to eliminate conditions conducive to panic.
f. You should recognize and compensate or minimize the following conditions that lead to uncertainty and panic:
(1) Physical conditions-scarcity of arms and ammunition, insufficient supporting weapons, fog, darkness, woods, baptism of fire, and introduction of new enemy weapons.
(2) Physiological conditions-hunger, thirst, fatigue, and exhaustion.
(3) Psychological conditions-danger (real or imaginary), anxiety, insecurity, ignorance of the military situation, tension, and expectant waiting.
(4) Morale conditions- homesickness, lack of mail, boredom, rumor, defeatist attitude, loss of confidence in leaders, and lack of belief in the cause.
(5) Tactical conditions- destruction of organization, heavy losses, reverses, conflicting orders, and poor communications. Panic is rarely caused by the strength of enemy action. There is danger of panic in a withdrawal. For this reason, carefully control withdrawals at all times. During a rearward movement, keep troops fully informed, within the limits of security, as to why it is being done and how and where the new line of resistance will be established.
(6) Leadership conditions- absence of leaders, loss of good leaders, and lack of confidence in the ability of leaders.
g. The ultimate defense against panic lies in good leadership, not only when panic starts but also in the months of training during which the troops are becoming seasoned.
h. You must take immediate and decisive action at the first sign of panic. Unity of action is often restored by the prompt action of the leader or a few volunteers who stand squarely in the path of flight, command the Soldiers to turn back, and do not hesitate to manhandle those Soldiers who come within reach or to threaten the others with weapons. Likewise, to the Soldier who is in terror and verging on panic, no influence can be more steadying than to see some other Soldier near them, and especially the leader, retaining their self-control and doing their duty.
i. A logical course of action to control panic includes the following:
(1) Decisive action on the part of the commander and their junior leaders.
(2) Presence of the commander and their display of a calm, confident attitude.
(3) Physical restraint on the part of the commander and junior leaders to stop men who are in a state of panic.
(4) Threatening Soldiers with weapons if all other means fail.
(5) Constant alertness for the development of conditions which produce panic.
Spirit of the Offensive (Maintaining Momentum)
a. The creation of a desire to close with and destroy the enemy is highly important in developing aggressiveness in military units. In a large measure it is gained by expert training, by the fostering of confidence, and through success in combat. Aggressive action is essential to secure objectives with minimum combat losses. The problem of maintaining aggressiveness is intensified during periods of inactivity.
b. Attainment of objectives depends on restoring the effectiveness of those units weakened by enemy action. With the rapid movement of modern warfare, it is imperative that ineffective Soldiers and equipment be replaced quickly. This entails efficient movement, proper reserve and support positions, and assignment of units to missions within their capabilities. To retain combat effectiveness, you should-
(1) Ensure that the chain of command remains intact.
(2) Maintain momentum and utilize firepower.
(3) Instill in Soldiers an aggressive attitude and a desire to destroy the enemy.
(4) Effectively use supporting fires to supplement organic firepower.
(5) Teach the unit to lean into supporting fires when attacking.
(6) Teach Soldiers to "talk it up" and support one another when moving.
(7) Constantly train to improve proficiency in weapon utilization and tactical maneuvers.
(8) Stress battlefield discipline and individual responsibilities.
(9) Set the example that you desire your Soldiers to emulate.
Restoration of Fighting Effectiveness
a. The fighting effectiveness of a unit decreases after sustained action or heavy losses, or during defensive situations and periods of inactivity. Units suffering heavy losses in Soldiers and equipment require time in a reserve position to assimilate replacements and reorganize.
b. One of the most effective means of restoring the confidence and esprit de corps of a unit which has failed or performed poorly in battle is to have it carry out creditably the same or commensurate tasks. The situation may dictate additional training or a change in command.
c. The following actions will help to rebuild confidence and esprit de corps and insure the maintenance of combat effectiveness:
(1) Keep informed on the status of personnel, weapons, equipment, and training so that replacements of personnel and equipment are made rapidly, and provisions are made for the proper integration of new Soldiers.
(2) Personally observe units in action in order to better assess their capabilities. Require additional training of the unit if the situation warrants.
(3) Constantly improve battle techniques and disseminate proven methods to the units.
(4) Carefully observe the physical, emotional, and mental state of the troops. Disseminate data on enemy casualties, the number of prisoners captured, and the amount of enemy equipment destroyed.
(5) Improve the health and welfare of the troops by emphasizing battle discipline to reduce unnecessary losses from all causes. These may include trench foot, malaria, and poor field sanitation, as well as enemy fire.
(6) Ensure that the chain of command remains intact by prompt replacement of commanders lost in action.
(7) Orient troops on the situation, pointing out that inactivity or defense is always a prelude to offensive combat.
(8) Command and reward the display of aggressiveness on the part of individuals and units. Express confidence in the unit's combat ability.
(9) Provide for and insure the proper use of the fire support plan.
Support of Isolated Units
a. The effect of enemy action sometimes results in the isolation of units on the battlefield. In such situations, units must be assured that the commander adequately appreciates their position and is confident of their ability to extricate themselves from the situation and perform their mission creditably. To prevent a deterioration of confidence and aggressiveness, furnish every possible support to isolated units.
b. Some specific steps are-
(1) Never let a unit think it has been abandoned.
(2) Immediately furnish all possible fire support.
(3) Make a positive attempt to assist.
(4) Reconstitute a chain of command if necessary.
(5) Keep the unit informed of all actions being taken.
Relations With Commanders of Supporting Units
a. When a unit of another arm or service supports their unit but is not attached, the commander may request, but cannot order, the desired assistance. However, the commander of the supporting unit must regard a request as an order unless it conflicts with orders of their commander.
b. The commander of the supporting unit, like the commander of the attached units, is an advisor to the commander. The Soldier advises the commander on the capabilities and limitations of the supporting unit. The Soldier recommends ways and means by which it may be best employed to serve the needs of the supported unit. The Soldier makes every effort to render the desired support.
c. The commander must keep supporting unit commanders informed of the situation and of the support the Soldier wishes to obtain. In order that the support rendered by the supporting unit be effective, it is necessary that adequate communication and liaison between the unit and supporting units be maintained by the supporting organization. The supporting unit must be kept informed of the movements and plans of the unit and locations of its forward elements and command post.
d. Attached units are subject to the decisions and orders of the commander. The attached unit commander is an advisor to the major unit commander on matters affecting the employment of the attached unit. The commander's relationships with the attached unit are the same as with organic units.
Leadership for Anchor Units to Include Allied Units
a. One of the major leadership problems that confront the commanders of larger commands such as groups, divisions, corps, and armies, is the proper handling of attached units. In corps especially there is a frequent turnover of divisions and separate units during the course of a campaign. The corps commander has the difficult problem of integrating newly attached units into the corps effort and of giving them a sense of belonging to the team. This calls for certain leadership techniques of a special nature in addition to the more general techniques previously discussed.
b. With the many alliances that the United States has made with the nations of the world, senior commanders can expect to have allied units attached on many occasions. To integrate newly attached units into their command, the commander should-
(1) Establish communication with a newly attached unit at the earliest practicable time.
(2) Ensure that liaison is established with a unit as soon as the Soldier learns it is to be attached.
(3) Deliver promptly a brief of all current standing operating procedures and administrative policies to the commander and staff of a newly attached unit.
(4) Make all necessary administrative arrangements for the efficient reception of a unit newly attached to their command.
(5) Ensure that administrative responsibility for attached units is clearly defined and promptly accepted.
(6) Require only necessary reporting to their headquarters by attached units.
(7) Require their staff to observe the chain of command in dealing with attached units.
(8) Visit attached units, even though they may be further attached to subordinate units.
(9) Require their staff to visit newly attached units to ascertain what assistance their command can render.
(10) Be familiar with the history of every unit attached to their command.
(11) Insist that subordinate commanders include attached units in recommendations for decorations and awards.
(12) Encourage commanders of attached units to make their problems or suggestions known to them.
(13) Check plans of subordinate commanders to see that attached units are not discriminated against in missions assigned.
(14) See that attached units receive their fair share of all privileges and welfare activities. Make these units feel that they are an integral part of their team.
(15) Write a letter of appreciation to a departing unit whenever its service merits such action.
(16) In the case of allied units, every effort must be made to obtain interpreters and to assist the attached commander with any problems peculiar to the customs of their army.
(17) By example, lessen the difficulties of the language barrier with allied units by attempting to learn words, phrases, idioms, and conversational sentences of their language.
Source: FM-100, pg.84-100
Photo by Art Guzman: https://www.pexels.com/photo/soldiers-watching-explosion-10854149/
Photo by Danilo Arenas: https://www.pexels.com/photo/paratroopers-on-hills-12514617/
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